Our everyday notions of responsibility are often driven by our need to justify ourselves to specific others -especially those we harm, wrong, or otherwise affect.
The need for future justification.
To respond adequately to climate change, and other threats to future generations, we urgently need a new ethic to balance responsibilities to future people against obligations to our contemporaries. The philosophical literature on climate change develops this new ethic and explores these new responsibilities.
1 But obligations to distant future people lack the felt moral urgency of obligations to contemporaries, and thus lose out (both in practice and in moral theory) when the two conflict. This paper asks how we might correct this imbalance. I imagine a broken future damaged by anthropogenic climate change, and ask how its more philosophical inhabitants might respond to our attempts to justify ourselves to them.
One challenge in intergenerational ethics is to develop a moderate theory that recognises obligations to future people without imposing extreme demands. 2 Any moderate intergenerational ethic faces two challenges: motivational and theoretical.
We must motivate present people to take their obligations to future people more 2 seriously than most of us do; and we need to know how those obligations should be balanced against our duties to one another.
This paper introduces an explicitly second-personal intergenerational ethic, drawing
on Stephen Darwall's recent work on the ethical significance of the second-person standpoint. 3 Our moral decisions must be justified, not merely against some impartial standard, but also to the particular individuals who are affected. If I sacrifice your life (whether for the common good or to save myself), then I must provide some moral justification that is addressed to you.
The second-person perspective does seem relevant between contemporaries. If it disappears when we turn to future people, then their interests will inevitably lose out.
One possibility, of course, is that second-personal justification is limited to contemporaries -and this is why intergenerational ethics is less important! But we should only accept this (comforting and self-serving) asymmetry after we have explored all the resources of future-oriented second-personalism and found them wanting.
If it succeeds, future-oriented second-personalism promises both motivational and theoretical benefits. One widespread actual motivation is a desire to justify oneself to particular individuals. Asking how actual future people might respond can thus give our intergenerational obligations the same kind of felt urgency as our obligations to contemporaries. And one sign that we have balanced intra-and inter-generational obligations appropriately is that we can justify ourselves equally well to both present and future people.
The idea of justifying ourselves to future people is common in everyday language.
(Even in our everyday lives, we sometimes pause to ask what our more distant descendants will think of us.) But it is largely absent in the philosophical literature.
One possible explanation is that justifications to distant future people face several obvious metaphysical and epistemological barriers which lead philosophers to regard such justifications as impossible. My first task is to remove those barriers.
Barriers to future justification.
3 Our first barrier is Derek Parfit's non-identity problem. 4 Parfit's non-identity problem has generated a vast literature. 5 9 When all these conditions are met -as they are in the cases discussed below -my justification must be very strong indeed. 10 Uncertainty is one possible justification for discounting the future, but it cannot suffice on its own. Unless we are sometimes justified in imposing definite harms, we cannot justify risks of significant harm either. I therefore set uncertainty aside in this paper, and focus on other reasons to discount future harm.
This may seem too swift. Any specific possible future is vanishingly unlikely to arise.
The more detail we add to our imaginary future, the more unlikely it becomes. Why should we justify ourselves to possible people who will almost certainly never exist, for things that will almost certainly never happen? Despite our three apparent barriers, future-oriented second-personalism is not absurd.
The rest of this paper argues that it is fruitful.
The Choice and the Broken World.
Justification is always offered to someone for something. The 'someone' is: future
people. But what are we answering to those future people for? To focus our discussion, I present an over-simplified example.
The Choice: We face a binary choice between two options: Business-as-usual and Conservation. These two policies offer the following payoffs to present and future people:
1. Present people fare better in Business-as-usual than in Conservation.
2. Future people fare better in Conservation than in Business-as-usual.
3. In Conservation, present people fare better than future people.
The four possible payoffs are thus ordered: Pb > Pc > Fc > Fb. I flesh-out the Choice using a broken world where resources are insufficient to meet everyone's basic needs, a chaotic climate makes life precarious, each generation is worse-off than the last, and our affluent way of life is no longer an option.
Philosophers in that broken world look back in disbelief at a lost age of affluence.
They struggle to make sense of the opulent worldview of late-affluent philosophers such as Nozick and Rawls, and the behaviour of affluent citizens like us. 14 The broken world lacks several ubiquitous but often unacknowledged presuppositions of recent moral and political thought. We naturally assume that future people will be better-off than present people; and that the interests of different generations largely coincide. In a broken world, by definition, future people are worse-off than present people, well-being continues to decline, and inter-generational conflicts of interest abound.
Another difference is that the broken world lacks Rawlsian favourable conditions. 15 A society enjoys favourable conditions if its members possess sufficient sophistication and prosperity to establish liberal democratic institutions that meet all basic needs without sacrificing any basic liberties. Rawls argues that virtually all modern societies enjoy favourable conditions. 16 But no broken society can meet all basic needs, and therefore none could possibly establish Rawlsian liberal institutions that both meet basic needs and protect basic liberties.
In a broken world, this future scarcity is an ongoing fact of life, not a one-off catastrophe. 17 Scarcity of material resources (especially water) and unpredictable climate mean that societies periodically face population bottlenecks where not everyone can survive. However, this is not a completely catastrophic world. I imagine modern large-scale industrialised societies, not scattered groupings of postapocalyptic hunter/gatherer tribes. Apart from its broken-ness, this future world is as close as possible to our own. 
Ethics within the broken future.
Before justifying ourselves to future people in a broken world, we must first explore their ethical thinking. Contemporary ethics presupposes that future people will be better-off than present people; that the interests of different generations largely coincide; and that favourable conditions will persist indefinitely. Other distinctive features of broken world ethics will emerge as we proceed. These are mostly corollaries of scarcity, the loss of favourable conditions, and the need for survival lotteries.
Impersonal defences.
Suppose we opt for Business-as-usual over Conservation. 
Agent-centred prerogatives.
If no impersonal defence is available, how else might we justify Business-as-usual?
We seek a moral principle that both justifies Business-as-usual and can itself be justified to future people. The rest of this paper explores our options. The next section considers exceptions based on emergencies, duties to less fortunate contemporaries, and rights to subsistence. In the present section, I explore moderate agent-centred prerogatives.
My catalogue of possible defences is not exhaustive. But I believe it does fairly represent our principal options. Once we admit that impersonal reasons favour Conservation, any defence of Business-as-usual requires either a permission to favour ourselves or an obligation that is owed to contemporaries but not to future people. The former can be either a general right to do as we please, or a specific right to protect some vital interest. And the latter must be based on some legitimate present expectation that future people cannot share. While other defences are imaginable, they are likely to resemble those outlined below. 27 Extremists insist that everyone should always adopt the impersonal perspective. 28 Extremists reject
Business-as-usual and defend very stringent obligations to avoid climate change. 29 As we seek to defend Business-as-usual, we can reasonably presuppose moderation and ask whether agent-centred prerogatives could justify Business-as-usual.
Agent-centred prerogatives belong to debates about beneficence. They come into play only when agents are not responsible for the plight of others, would not be violating any moral rules, and would be using their own legitimate resources. Giving to charity is beneficent. But paying tax, repaying debts, returning stolen property, and refraining from murder are not. Moderate moral theory recognises a distinction between doing and allowing, and also regards our duty to assist strangers as weaker than our duty not to harm them. 30 Agent-centred prerogatives thus apply only when two necessary conditions are met:
innocence and ownership. 31 Imagine a very simple case. Rich wants to put her own interests ahead of Poor's. The innocence condition stipulates that Rich is not herself responsible for Poor's plight, and Rich's favouring herself violates no deontological rule. This condition looks both backward and forward. Rich can refrain from helping a stranger, but she cannot kill a healthy relative to inherit his wealth, or fail to avert a threat that she herself has created.
The ownership condition stipulates that the resources Rich keeps for herself already belong to her. Rich is deliberating about the disposal of her own individual private property, not the distribution of manna from heaven. Rich can refuse to share her food because she wants to throw a lavish banquet, but she cannot steal Poor's food to do the same.
Any plausible moderate account of beneficence endorses these two necessary conditions. It is controversial whether these conditions are met even in the standard case of aid for spatially distant contemporaries. 32 We can side-step that controversy.
Our question is whether the two conditions are met in the Choice. In particular, will our future philosopher recognise either our innocence or our ownership? We can imagine her response. 
Emergency prerogatives, duties to contemporaries, and subsistence rights.
Neither impersonal defences nor general agent-centred prerogatives will persuade future philosophers. Perhaps the best defence lies in-between. Present people's sacrifice in Conservation is less significant than what they impose on future people.
But it is still sufficient to justify Business-as-usual.
Not all prerogatives are limited to beneficence. Even without innocence and ownership, agents can still legitimately steal to feed themselves or their children, kill in self-defence, or save themselves ahead of those they have harmed. In an 'emergency', even moral prohibitions on theft, murder, and harm may be suspended.
Is the Choice such a moral emergency?
Any Human rights conflict in the Choice. We thus face an obvious dilemma. Either our account of rights recognises future people's human right to subsistence, or it does not.
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If not, they will reject any defence based upon that account. But if we do recognise their rights, how can we defend Business-as-usual?
The problem is that our notion of human rights does not admit even the possibility of irreconcilable conflicts. Human rights must be guaranteed to all. Yet, in a broken future where not everyone can even survive, such conflicts are a regrettable fact of life. Perhaps our future philosophers can teach us how to rethink our affluent notion of rights.
'To justify themselves to us, the affluents must offer us intelligible interpretations of rights, luxury, and subsistence that fit our moral perspective. To persuade future people, any justification of Business-as-Usual based on our rights must appeal to some general account of rights that they also enjoy. Because survival cannot be guaranteed in a broken world, future people cannot themselves enjoy a right to subsistence. Therefore, they will reasonably deny that all present people enjoy a right to guaranteed subsistence. Some future people will reject rights altogether, while those who retain rights will reinterpret them in ways that undermine any rights-based defence of Business-as-Usual.
Can

What rights do we have?
Our future philosopher reconceptualises rights in light of some future survival lottery:
a social institution that spreads risk fairly while maintaining incentives to social cooperation. A just lottery will maximise our collective chances of survival, and then fairly distribute individual chances to survive.
If there are rights that all individuals (both present and future) can enjoy, they must be lottery-based rights. But now present individuals can reject Conservation if it prevents their survival without also instituting something like a just lottery. We cannot simply abandon Business-as-usual and let the chips fall where they may. But nor can we justly continue with Business-as-usual. Instead, we must collectively bear the burden of the sacrifices we owe to future people.
This may seem too much to ask. Surely we are not obliged to actually decide who lives and who dies? We close by imagining our future philosopher's final reply. 
